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Survey and Clearance of  
   Unexploded Submunitions Versus  
      Landmines and Other ERW
by Åsa Gilbert and Michael Creighton [ GICHD ]
The authors argue that survey and clearance methods in areas contaminated solely by unexploded 
submunitions (from cluster munitions) should be different than those in areas contaminated by mines 
and other explosive remnants of war to achieve the most efficient outcome. This article seeks to ex-
plain how and why procedures are different, and proposes a land-release methodology for dealing 
with unexploded submunitions.
Traditionally, the systematic clearance of explosive hazards is grouped into two main categories: land-mine clearance and battle-area clearance.
While the land-release principles are similar for both, the 
operational methodologies applied to each category are dif-
ferent. Since mines are designed to be victim-activated, they 
pose a more direct risk to clearance technicians than do sub-
munitions, which are designed to detonate before, upon or 
after impact. Thus, if mines and ERW are in the same area, 
the situation should first be treated as a mine-hazard problem 
and then as an ERW hazard. 
Addressing areas contaminated by unexploded submu-
nitions is classified as a BAC activity, but the operational 
procedures used are, in many ways, similar to mine clear-
ance. Therefore, a truly efficient operational approach to 
the clearance of submunitions must incorporate aspects of 
BAC and mine-clearance procedures.
Characteristics of CMs and Explosive Submunitions
Because of the characteristics outlined below (pattern, met-
al content, failure rate and risk of accidental functioning), the 
land-release methodology for submunitions can, and should 
be, distinct from mine clearance and other ERW clearance.
Pattern. The clearance of submunitions is distinct from the 
clearance of mines and other ERW, largely due to the unique 
patterns of dispersal and explosion exhibited by cluster mu-
nitions. Thus, in order to efficiently handle submunitions, 
clearance teams must not rely heavily on standard operating 
procedures used in mine clearance. Instead, techniques must 
be used for submunition identification and clearance that 






account the scattering pattern, metal content, failure rate 
and risk for accidental detonation of submunitions.
•	 Cluster munitions/submunitions. Cluster munitions are 
distinct from other munitions. When fired, launched or 
dropped, the explosive submunitions are dispersed or 
released, and create a strike pattern or footprint on the 
ground. Unexploded submunitions will undoubtedly be 
within this footprint area, because of the high failure 
rate of explosive submunitions, as discussed later in this 
article. By identifying the footprint’s shape, the center 
Convention on Cluster Munitions Article 2 
definitions as used in this article1:
Cluster Munition: a conventional muni-
tion that is designed to disperse or re-
lease explosive submunitions, each 
weighing less than 20 kilograms, and in-
cludes those explosive submunitions
• Explosive Submunition: a convention-
al munition that in order to perform its 
task is dispersed or released by a cluster 
munition and is designed to function by 
detonating an explosive charge prior to, 
on or after impact
• Unexploded Submunition: an explosive 
submunition that has been dispersed 
or released by, or otherwise separated 
from, a cluster munition and has failed to 
explode as intended
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and outer edge of the strike can be better determined. 
This facilitates a more precise, systematic search of the 
hazardous area.
•	 ERW. In general, explosive remnants of war such as air-
craft bombs, mortars and artillery shells, do not create a 
predictable pattern or footprint after being fired or deliv-
ered but may be concentrated in certain areas.
•	 Mines. Mines are often laid in rows and set patterns, so 
methodologies can be developed to assist clearing pat-
terned minefields. Even when mines are laid randomly 
(generally known as nuisance minefields), it may still be 
viable to identify and analyze the laying tactics. There-
fore, it is possible to determine areas likely to be mined 
and release areas that have no evidence of mines.
Metal content. Normally, submunitions contain signifi-
cantly more metal than regular anti-personnel mines or non-
metal cased anti-vehicle mines. This means that less sensitive 
detectors/locators, such as magnetometers, that are not sensi-
tive enough to detect mines can be used effectively to detect 
the more metallic submunitions.
Failure rate.  Research indicates that the failure rate of 
submunitions varies, but could be as high as 30 percent. Com-
pared to other ERW types, this is considered high. The high 
failure rate is a result of several factors. The most dominant 
factor is linked to the arming process and fuze design, but 
other factors, such as quality of materials, storage procedures, 
weapons release conditions, weather and type of terrain may 
all contribute to the failure of submunitions to detonate.2 
Each cluster munition holds a large number of submuni-
tions (up to several hundred in each container). This, coupled 
with the high percentage that fail to detonate, can create a 
grouped pattern of unexploded submunitions, i.e., the foot-
print as discussed previously in this article.
Risk of accidental functioning. Fuzing of explosive sub-
munitions varies, depending on the make and model. Most 
An example footprint/pattern of 155 mm delivered explosive 
submutitions. The impact marks in this photo show the ex-
tent of the footprint.
Photo courtesy of FFI, the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment.
types are designed to detonate on impact with the ground or 
target. This is different from mines, which are generally de-
signed to be victim-activated. 
Unlike AP mines, the risk of activating a submunition be-
low the surface by stepping on the ground above it is usu-
ally considered very low. Therefore, the area of a suspected 
submunition stike can usually be accessed to conduct survey 
activities. The principle to note is that unexploded submuni-
tions should not be compared to AP mines, which in most 
cases, are victim activated.
It should be emphasized that accessing areas contaminat-
ed by unexploded submunitions should only be conducted by 
trained technicians. Even though unexploded submunitions 
do not pose an immediate threat to explosive ordnance dispos-
al personnel as AP mines do, this should not be misunderstood 
as a lack of danger to the local population. Unexploded sub-
munitions remain a danger to these communities and should 
be dealt with accordingly; however, on a procedural level, the 
risk of accidental functioning during clearance is much lower 
in the case of submunitions than with landmines.
Land-release Methodology
The footprints, or dispersal patterns, of submunitions can 
be used for more efficient survey of contaminated land. Teams 
can use the identification of one submunition as an indication 
of the presence of more submunitions in the same area, due to 
their high failure rate and dispersal characteristics.
Even if the conflict occurred several years earlier, or if a 
large number of the submunitions were moved and/or de-
stroyed, the presence of one submunition remains a reliable 
indication of other submunitions in the area. In the case of 
overlapping strikes, locating the point where the footprints 
end is necessary. This requires clear and agreed working pro-
cedures on how to plan and conduct survey and clearance.
Sometimes the drills and equipment used during submu-
nition survey and clearance are similar to those used in mine 
clearance, e.g., a systematic search below ground using detec-
tors. However, using mine-clearance procedures and equip-
ment during the survey and clearance of submunitions is 
highly inefficient, and should be avoided whenever possible. 
This is because the metal content is significantly higher in 
submunitions than in mines, and submunitions are not de-
signed to be detonated by applying pressure. Nevertheless, 
because of the cost and logistical challenges involved in pur-
chasing new equipment, when an organization undertakes 
the survey and clearance of submunitions, it may have to em-
ploy detectors designed to detect minimum-metal mines and 
use procedures developed for mine clearance. 
Summary table. Different characteristics of mines, submunitions and other UXO.
Graphic courtesy of the authors.
Submunition survey and clearance, therefore, can gener-
ally be conducted using more rapid and effective procedures 
than for mine clearance. These procedures provide several ad-
vantages, including the following:
•	 Quicker search procedures. When the contamina-
tion type contains a high metal content and does not 
include pressure/victim-activated devices, the search 
can be faster. In most cases, it is considered safe to 
conduct a surface search by walking the suspected 
area, coupled with vegetation cutting (if needed), to 
allow a more thorough ground search.
•	 Quicker marking. Depending on which working 
procedures are used, a less comprehensive marking 
system may be justified. A systematic search below 
ground may require a more complex marking system; 
however, some techniques, such as a surface-visual 
search, may allow for an expedited, less comprehen-
sive marking system.
•	 Quicker site set up/take down. As a result of the less 
comprehensive marking system, the site set-up and 
take-down will be less time-consuming.
Although land-release methodologies for submunitions 
may not be as straight forward as for a patterned minefield, 
similar land-release principles, like the use of an evidence-
based approach and the principle of all reasonable effort, 
should be applied. For instance, heavy contamination, in-
tended land use or other factors may demand slower, more 
meticulous clearance procedures, which draw more heavily 
on mine-action principles.
Evidence-based Approach
A proposed methodology for the survey and clearance of 
submunitions is an evidence-based approach, that is, when 
clear evidence indicates the presence of submunitions, this 
method can be used, including when:
•	 Evidence of a strike is confirmed by either physical debris 
or a strong claim (by an informant). 
•	 An evidence point is created, and from this point further 
survey/clearance commences. 
Evidence-point criteria. The national mine-action author-
ity and operators should develop and agree upon the criteria 
for the required level of evidence needed to create an evidence 
point. In general, however, when any of the following are pres-
ent, an evidence point can be established: 
•	 Unexploded submunitions
•	 Fragmentation of submunitions




•	 A strong claim by an informant stating that unex-
ploded submunitions are located in the area 
In some countries, suspected hazardous areas can be 
linked to boundaries that have been determined by the af-
fected community. As people with no mine/ERW experience 
(local residents) tend to define these areas, however, civilians 
generally think the contaminated areas are larger than they 
actually are. As a result, assets are deployed to areas where no 
2
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evidence of contamination exists, instead of in evidence-based 
confirmed hazardous areas.
For effective use of resources and planning purposes, es-
timated areas may be attributed to each evidence point. The 
community should be closely involved in the process of iden-
tifying evidence points. However, this area should not be seen 
as an actual hazardous area, nor the boundaries as the extent 
of any contamination. Well-defined criteria will ensure that 
only land qualifying for further technical survey/clearance 
will be recorded and tasked for future activity. As stated pre-
viously, the local population should be involved in the process, 
but the final decision should be evidence-based and made by 
technically-qualified staff, following defined criteria.
Initial response. In the initial post-conflict phase, the rap-
id removal and destruction of surface-located submunitions is 
necessary in order to remove the immediate threat to the lo-
cal inhabitants. During this process, there may not be enough 
time to gather and record all available information. Most im-
portantly, a minimum record should be kept and entered into a 
database, such as the specific location (using a Global Position-
ing System) of each individual item, the munition type found 
and the number of items destroyed. These records will facili-
tate the analysis of the data at a later stage. Also, sufficient and 
accurate recording of each item’s location enables the footprint 
of the strike to be identified later and technical survey/clear-
ance assets to be efficiently deployed in contaminated areas.
Mine-action programs often have roving EOD or rapid-
response teams that carry out spot tasks (removal of individu-
al munitions found) on an as-needed basis. As with the above 
example, a detailed record is very important for keeping all 
tasks, and this record should be incorporated into the later 
planning and tasking of technical survey/clearance teams.
Non-technical Survey. Before conducting a Non-technical 
Survey, a desk assessment should take place, analyzing previ-
ous survey records, EOD spot-task records and bombing data 
(if available). Then, the NTS teams should deploy to the field 
to investigate any previously recorded suspected-hazardous 
areas/evidence points and identify any new ones.
Fade-out. A fade-out is the agreed distance from a specific evidence point where the 
Technical Survey/clearance is carried out. The fade-out distance is determined by the 
conditions specific to the area (i.e., geographical conditions, hazard type, delivery meth-
ods, etc.) and should be based on operational experience.
If credible evidence corresponding with the correct level 
outlined in national standards and standard operating pro-
cedures is not found, the survey team should not record an 
evidence point or a hazardous area. This is essential for the va-
lidity of an evidence-based methodology, and avoids inflating 
the problem by populating the database with hazardous areas 
based on vague information or weak claims not based on any 
actual evidence.
Conversely, if sound evidence is available and the NTS 
team can clearly identify evidence of cluster-munition rem-
nants, an evidence point should be recorded. If enough clear 
evidence exists to determine which specific area is contami-
nated, then the survey team should document the boundaries 
of the contamination. This can provide better planning infor-
mation for further Technical Survey and clearance. However, 
this should only be done if the boundaries of the contamina-
tion area can be clearly identified.
Strikemark dual-purpose improved conventional munitions M77.
Photo courtesy of Åsa Gilbert.
Technical Survey and clearance. Once an NTS team con-
ducts a survey and if a hazardous area or an area identified 
by an evidence point is identified, the area is then subjected 
to Technical Survey and/or clearance. The two activities are 
generally conducted concurrently, even though some orga-
nizations employ separate specialized Technical Survey and 
clearance teams.
With an evidence-based approach, the task is carried 
out in the same manner, whether the area only requires a 
surface search or if items are below the surface. The team 
commences the Technical Survey/clearance at the evidence 
point’s location and then works its way outward to the agreed 
fade-out point.
If no other submunitions are found once the fade-out dis-
tance is applied and searched, it is reasonable to determine 
that no other submunitions remain from that strike/foot-
print. To give an example, if the fade-out is 50 meters (54.68 
Figure A (top). One piece of evidence was found in the area. Clearance starts at the location of the evidence (red dot). If no further 
evidence is encountered within the fade-out (x meters in all directions from the evidence operationally conducted as a box search),
no additional survey/clearance is required.
Figure B (bottom). Three separate locations with evidence were identified during the initial NTS. The survey team identified a haz-
ardous area polygon based on the evidence. During the survey/clearance operation, all evidence was dealt with individually. When 
applying the fade-out and if additional evidence is found, the survey/clearance is extended. If no further evidence is found, the re-
maining area is released.
Figure A
Figure B
Technical Clearance Process as Illustrated 
in Figures A and B:





2. Start clearance at the location  
    of the evidence.
3. Clear x meters in all directions according 
    to the agreed distance for FADEOUT from 
    evidence (wx. 50m).
4. If no futher evidence has been  
    found, stop clearance.
5. If no futher evedence has been found/ 
    reported in the area, the CHA is released.
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yards), the ground will be processed for 
a distance of 50 m in all directions from 
where the evidence point is located. If 
no further evidence is found, the sur-
vey/clearance will stop. A total of 10,000 
square meters (2.47 acres) will have been 
technically surveyed/cleared.
Conclusion
Submunitions are different from 
mines and other ERW in a number of 
ways. Because of these unique charac-
teristics, it is an advantage to develop a 
unique land-release methodology for the 
survey and clearance of submunitions so 
that the most efficient approach is used.
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Although some mine-clearance 
procedures are also suitable for sub-
munition survey and clearance, it is 
important that more efficient proce-
dures specifically tailored to cluster-
munitions identification and removal, 
including establishing the submunitions 
footprint, are used when possible.  
See endnotes page 82
Surface Search - Visual.
Photo courtesy of Asa Gilbert.
NPA’s Survey and Clearance of 
   Cluster Munitions Along the  
      Thailand-Cambodia Border 
by Atle Karlsen [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
The February conflict at the Thailand-Cambodia border over disputed territory has left Cambodia with 
the burden of clearing cluster munitions. By applying to the Thai-Cambodian conflict strategies for 
cluster munitions removal that were successful in other post-conflict areas, NPA is assisting the Cam-
bodian Mine Action Centre in cleaning up the problem. Thailand and Cambodia have not acceded to 
the ban on cluster munitions established in the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions and are there-
fore not subject to its provisions. Both countries attended the CCM 2011 intersessional meeting in 
June, leaving many hopeful that the two countries will become States Parties. 
Thai and Cambodian troops exchanged fire 4–7 Febru-ary 2011 over disputed territory along the border near the Preah Vihear temple in northern Cambodia, a 
UNESCO World Heritage site. On 10 February, the Cambodi-
an Mine Action Centre reported it had evidence that Thai forc-
es fired cluster munitions into areas in Preah Vihear province.
Funded by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Norwegian People’s Aid began a new survey project in 
Cambodia in 2011 to establish the extent of the cluster-mu-
nition remnants problem across the country using method-
ologies developed through NPA’s work in Lao PDR, Lebanon, 
Serbia and Vietnam. CMAC asked NPA to conduct an emer-
gency survey of the affected areas. Simultaneously, in Thailand, 
in cooperation with the Thailand Mine Action Center, NPA 
conducted a survey of the sites on the Thai border that were at-
tacked with Cambodian artillery during the February conflict.
Neither Thailand nor Cambodia has acceded to the Con-
vention on Cluster Munitions, but positive statements by both 
nations during the CCM’s first intersessional meetings offered 
hope that they would join the CCM soon. Follow-up meetings, 
in Cambodia and Thailand in mid-August 2011 included mil-
itary-to-military dialogue on the obligations of the CCM and 
alternative, more cost-efficient ways to destroy cluster-muni-
tion stockpiles.
Assessment of the Situation
On 1 and 2 April 2011, a delegation from NPA, CMAC and 
the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor visited Cambodia’s 
affected areas. The objectives of the assessment were to con-
firm cluster-munition use in Preah Vihear province (number 
of sites contaminated/types of munitions used) and to assess 
the impact of cluster-munition contamination on the popula-
tion. In Sen Chey village the assessment team found that clus-
ter munitions had hit several houses and people were living 
among the unexploded submunitions.
The assessment team recorded the locations of all unex-
ploded munitions found, and evidence from cluster-munition 
strikes was gathered (spacers/ribbons, fragments, etc.). It was 
confirmed that Thailand delivered the cluster munitions by 
artillery, namely the 155mm NR 269. The assessment also de-
termined that unexploded M42/M46 contaminated the area. 
M85 SD in Cambodia
All photos courtesy of Stephanie de Gref, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor.
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